SECURO / EVIDENCE COVERAGE

Supported evidence.Visible limitations.

Search Securo's collection and correlation capabilities. Every item states what it can establish and what may limit it.

22
DOCUMENTED CAPABILITIES
2
SUPPORTED PLATFORMS
3
CONFIDENCE LEVELS
01

Prefetch execution

WindowsCollection
SUPPORTED

Execution traces and referenced paths

Available when Windows Prefetch is enabled and readable.

02

Unified execution history

WindowsCorrelation
SUPPORTED

Combines process-creation events, Prefetch hints, and registry context with path and available signer status

Registry traces are not execution proof; signatures are only shown when checked. Missing paths do not prove deletion.

03

USN Journal

WindowsCollection
SUPPORTED

File creation, deletion, rename, and change context

Journal retention and administrator access affect depth.

04

Per-file USN activity

WindowsCorrelation
SUPPORTED

Groups bounded USN changes and computes observed create-to-delete intervals

Both timestamps must be present; observed interval is not necessarily a file's total lifetime.

05

ShellBags

WindowsCollection
SUPPORTED

Historical folder interaction and removed locations

Timestamps and paths are context, not proof by themselves.

06

Installed programs and registry traces

WindowsCollection
SUPPORTED

Uninstall entries plus UserAssist, BAM, and Compatibility Assistant context

Keys may be unavailable; presence alone does not prove execution or cheating.

07

Known USB devices

WindowsCollection
SUPPORTED

USB hardware model, device class, and current device status

Device serials are omitted; this does not establish connection times or file transfers.

08

Application memory references

WindowsCollection
SUPPORTED

Download hosts and file names from a bounded read of selected running applications

Requires separate consent. Sensitive/system processes are excluded; raw memory and full URLs are not saved.

09

Detailed PowerShell history

WindowsCollection
SUPPORTED

Opt-in bounded command history from readable user profiles

Individual PSReadLine commands lack timestamps; private text may remain despite common-secret redaction.

10

Download-to-execution trail

WindowsCorrelation
SUPPORTED

Links browser download metadata, a file's download-origin marker, exact path or hash execution evidence, and Roblox timing

Only shown when independent artifacts match; an absent marker or same filename alone proves nothing.

11

Module and driver loads

WindowsExternals
SUPPORTED

Sysmon Roblox DLL and suspicious driver loads, plus relevant Code Integrity warnings

Requires those Windows logs to exist; a load or block event alone is not a cheat verdict.

12

Event-log clearing

WindowsCollection
SUPPORTED

Security and System log-clear events shown on the forensic timeline

A cleared log has many possible causes and does not prove cheating.

13

Explained findings

BothCorrelation
SUPPORTED

Shows supporting sources, first-observed time, confidence, and alternative explanations

Reviewers still need to verify the underlying evidence before deciding.

14

Sysmon process access

WindowsExternals
SUPPORTED

Dangerous handles and remote-thread activity targeting Roblox

Requires Sysmon with relevant event IDs configured.

15

External artifact behavior

WindowsExternals
SUPPORTED

Memory, overlay/input, mapper, and driver-assisted indicators

Heuristics require multiple signals to reduce overlay false positives.

16

Roblox player logs

BothRoblox activity
SUPPORTED

Accounts, games, places, launches, exits, flags, and session events

Deleted or rotated logs reduce historical reach.

17

Game/account sessions

BothAccounts
SUPPORTED

Account and game reconstruction with timestamped nearby findings

Account identifiers are non-secret and source-dependent.

18

Model Sapphire correlation

BothCorrelation
SUPPORTED

Joins independent artifacts into explainable confidence

Correlation strength depends on collector availability.

19

Deleted-file recovery

WindowsExploit artifacts
SUPPORTED

Recycle Bin, USN, Prefetch, and recovery metadata

Securo preserves metadata; it does not restore or modify files.

20

FastFlag evidence

BothExploit artifacts
SUPPORTED

Client flags grouped with source logs and sessions

A flag is not automatically cheating; context determines classification.

21

macOS persistence

macOSCollection
SUPPORTED

Launch agents, login items, applications, and file artifacts

Full Disk Access may be needed for complete coverage.

22

Report preservation

BothCorrelation
SUPPORTED

Detailed collected evidence remains auditable in local reports

Reports reflect what collectors could access at scan time; raw application memory is not retained.

Honest measurement: this page documents supported capabilities, not a universal detection-rate claim. Collector access, log retention, permissions, operating-system configuration, and adversary behavior all affect available evidence.